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“Code Name SEKRETÁŘ”: Amílcar Cabral, Czechoslovakia and the Role of 
Human Intelligence during the Cold War 
Dr. Natalia Telepneva, University of Warwick, British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow 
 
Abstract 
Since 1961, Czechoslovakia was a key supporter of the liberation struggle in Guinea- Bissau, 
providing the PAIGC with arms, monthly financial assistance, and scholarships for military 
training. The extraordinary extent of this assistance can be partly explained through the 
‘special relationship’ developed between Amilcar Cabral and Czechoslovakia’s Ministry of the 
Interior. Based on newly released records from the Czechoslovak security archives, this paper 
examines this clandestine relationship, addressing Prague’s motivation for recruiting Cabral 
as ‘clandestine contact’ under code name SEKRETÁŘ (‘Secretary’ in Czech) as well as the 
ways in which its intelligence services sought Cabral’s help in order to make sense of African 
politics and to engage with leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah.  Through the analysis of the 
‘give and take’ between Cabral and Czechoslovak officials, the paper argues that, in many 
ways, the former shaped the relationship with Czechoslovakia to the benefit of the PAIGC. By 
demystifying the relationship between Cabral and Czechoslovak intelligence, the paper 
provides an insight into the agency of so-called peripheral actors and of human intelligence in 
the Cold War.  
Word count: 10,405  
 
Introduction 
On 21 June, 1961, the Czechoslovak minister of the interior, Rudolf Barák, received 
a top secret letter from an intelligence officer based in Conakry, the capital of the 
Republic of Guinea. The author of the letter, ‘Lieutenant Alter Miroslav’, proposed 
to recruit one of his regular contacts in Conakry, SEKRETÁŘ, to collaborate with 
Czechoslovak intelligence. An agronomy engineer born in the neighbouring Guinea-
Bissau, SEKRETÁŘ was the General Secretary of the African Independence Party 
(Partido Africana da Independeza – PAI), with whom ALTER had established 
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cordial relations since his first arrival in Conakry in 1960.1 In the course of their 
meetings, argued ALTER, SEKRETÁŘ had provided useful information about 
African politics and the role of the USA on the continent. As general secretary of the 
PAI, argued ALTER, SEKRETÁŘ had good opportunities to provide useful 
information. Additionally, SEKRETÁŘ was likely to gain a position of leadership in 
the movement for the independence of Guinea-Bissau, a small Portuguese colony in 
West Africa. ALTER’s letter was directed to Barák because it was he who presided 
over Czechoslovak intelligence, officially known as the First Directorate of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Barák approved the request.2 
 “SEKRETÁŘ” (Secretary) was the Czechoslovak code name for Amílcar 
Lopes Cabral (1924-73). Born on 12 September in 1924 in Bafata, Guinea-Bissau, 
Cabral was the son of Juvenal Cabral, a schoolteacher, and Iva Panel Evora, the owner 
of a small hotel. When his parents divorced, Cabral’s family moved to Cape Verde, 
where he attended the Liceu Gil Eanes in Mindelo (São Vicente island)—the only 
school in the whole archipelago that offered education that prepared students for the 
university level. In 1948, Cabral received a scholarship to study agronomy at the 
University of Lisbon. Already steeped in the problems of Cape Verde, in Lisbon, 
Cabral formed friendships with other students from Portuguese colonies and engaged 
in nationalist activism. Marxist ideas were popular among students from the colonies, 
not least because the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) dominated the underground 
anti-fascist struggle in Portugal after the Second World War. Amílcar Cabral was 
inspired by Marxist ideas and envisioned a future free from capitalist exploitation. 
Having graduated from university the top of his class, Cabral took up a job at an 
agricultural research station in Bissau, where he organised a group to discuss the 
problems of Portuguese colonies.3  
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While the British and the French had decided to give up formal rule over their 
African colonies by 1958, Portugal’s President of the Council of Ministers António 
de Oliveira Salazar believed that the empire was fundamental to the nation, 
entrenched in the constitution of the Estado Novo dictatorship (New State). At the 
time when most colonial governments entered into a dialogue with nationalist parties 
in their colonies, Salazar’s regime was adamant about retaining Portugal’s overseas 
possessions. In the late 1950s, repression of the nationalist activists intensified, 
pushing activists into exile. On one of his last visits to Bissau in 1959, Cabral founded 
an organisation that would become known as the Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). In 1960, Cabral moved to Conakry, the capital of 
Guinea, from where he launched preparations for armed struggle across the border in 
neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. As of 1960 however, the PAIGC was only a small 
group of like-minded people who had to compete with a number of nationalist groups 
who had found safe haven in Guinea. In the following years, Cabral would manage 
to overcome his local rivals and secure international support for the PAIGC, which 
would come to dominate the nationalist movement. Czechoslovakia became the first 
international donor to the PAIGC, providing the first comprehensive assistance 
package, including cash, training, and arms, in 1961. It was in this context that 
ALTER proposed (and got approval) to recruit Cabral as a confidential contact 
(důvěrný styk) of Czechoslovak intelligence.  
The ideas and life of Amílcar Cabral have been the subject of substantial 
historical research. Since Cabral’s assassination in January 1973, there has emerged 
a substantial literature on Cabral’s ideas and his contribution to the theory of African 
liberation. Cabral has also been celebrated as a shrewd politician and a talented 
diplomat, who managed to secure support for the PAIGC from a variety of 
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international donors: from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Nordic countries, to name 
a few. Works by Patrick Chabal, Pierro Gleijeses, and Mustafa Dhada all highlight 
the role of Cabral’s personal diplomacy in securing the necessary support that enabled 
the PAIGC to launch a successful offensive against the Portuguese army in 1973.4 
We know that Cabral was a talented diplomat, yet we don’t fully know what this often 
entailed in the context of the global Cold War. At the same time, the field of Cold 
War studies has expanded since the 1990s with the declassification of archives in 
Russia and Eastern Europe. We know much more about the role of the so-called 
‘peripheral actors’ such as Czechoslovakia, as well as the importance of the Third 
World in the global struggle.5 Since the end of the Cold War, there have emerged a 
number of memoirs by intelligence agents on both sides of the Cold War divide, 
which touch upon their experiences in the Third World. 6  In Near and Distant 
Neighbours, Jonathan Haslam has provided many more details about the evolution of 
Soviet intelligence operations, especially highlighting the role of military intelligence 
(GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate).7 The role of secret intelligence in the Cold 
War still remains somewhat of a black box, with a few exceptions. 8  We are 
particularly in the dark when it comes to the role of secret intelligence in Africa—an 
important theatre of rivalry between the superpowers and their allies as the pace of 
decolonisation accelerated in the 1950s.  
This paper focuses on Cabral’s relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence 
from 1961-73 as a case study of ‘human intelligence’ (HUMINT, in the jargon of the 
intelligence services) in the Cold War. ALTER forged first contacts with Amílcar 
Cabral in 1960, when the latter arrived in Conakry to establish the headquarters for 
the organisation that would be known, after several name changes, as the PAIGC. 
ALTER established what he believed were close personal relations with Cabral and 
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facilitated his trip to Prague in 1961. After Prague ‘recruited’ Cabral in August 1960, 
Czechoslovak intelligence and Cabral forged a close relationship, which entailed 
Cabral sharing information about events and participating in so-called ‘active 
operations’ of the Czechoslovak rezidentura (jargon for the Czechoslovak 
intelligence station) in Conakry. After the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
was toppled in 1966 and exiled to Conakry, Cabral offered Prague a window into 
Nkrumah’s plans. As he became an increasingly popular and influential figure, 
Cabral’s contacts with the Czechoslovaks dwindled towards the late 1960s.  
This paper argues that Cabral managed to direct his relationship with 
Czechoslovak intelligence to the advantage of the PAIGC. By demystifying the 
nature of Cabral’s relationship with the Czechoslovak intelligence, this paper rejects 
claims that leaders of the liberation movements like Cabral were mere pawns of 
Moscow. On the contrary, it provides insight into the strategies that Cabral used for 
his cause—the liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The paper also highlights 
the agency of Czechoslovakia as an active actor in the Cold War in its own right. In 
as much as Cabral did not follow orders from Prague, Czechoslovakia pursued an 
active policy in Africa for their own internal goals. As such, this paper highlights the 
agency of non-peripheral actors: the strategy they used for their own goals, as well as 
the limitations of their projects in the Cold War context.  
Recruitment, 1961 
The expansion of the Czechoslovak presence in Africa was enabled by 
tremendous changes in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. In March 1953, Joseph Stalin 
died and was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev, a dynamic leader who launched an 
activist policy in the Third World. Khrushchev believed that the USSR and its allies 
in Eastern Europe should pursue and active policy in the Third World to enhance the 
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power of the Soviet bloc.9 At the same time, Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of 
Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) in February 1956 led to calls for reform across the socialist bloc and 
leadership changes—in Poland and Hungary, on waves of massive social protest. In 
Czechoslovakia, the situation was relatively quiet. The first secretary of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), Antonín Novotný, was not a popular 
figure at home at home and relied on continuous support from Moscow. Khrushchev’s 
new policy in the Third World allowed Novotný and the Central Committee of the 
CPC Politburo to prove their worth to the Soviet leadership and also carve out for 
Czechoslovakia a significant role in the Warsaw Pact and in the international arena. 
Besides Novotný, one man who was allegedly interested in pursuing a much more 
activist foreign policy in Africa was the minister of the interior, Rudolf Barák. 
Originally a Social Democrat, Barák emerged as a functionary of the CPC in the Brno 
region in 1945, rising steadily within the party hierarchy. In September 1953, he was 
appointed minister of the interior, which had subsumed the state security (StB; Státní 
Bezpečnost) and foreign intelligence bureaus. A dynamic and ambitious man, he was 
rumoured to harbour ambitions to supersede Antonín Novotný as the CC CPC first 
secretary. Known for his pleasant, outgoing manner, Barák also established good 
contacts with Soviet security advisors. He was keenly interested in foreign affairs and 
often met with foreign dignitaries coming to Prague with requests for assistance.10 
Besides internal politics, Czechoslovakia had economic reasons to pursue 
activist policy in Africa. One of the most industrialised states in Eastern Europe, 
Czechoslovakia had developed an advanced arms manufacturing industry, supplying 
weapons to its ‘Little Entente’ allies Romania and Yugoslavia in the 1920s, to Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s, and to Israel in 1948. Czechoslovakia had long-standing 
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commercial relations countries that dated to the pre-war period and did not end when 
the CPC took control of the country in February 1948. Africa was a potentially a big 
market for Czechoslovak arms and goods, and Prague quickly became a supplier of 
small arms to the continent. The potential of Soviet and Czechoslovak cooperation 
became apparent when, in September 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced 
that Czechoslovakia had agreed to sell US$45.7 worth of weapons to Egypt, as part 
of an agreement underwritten by the USSR. While the deal was initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, it was widely seen as a sign of new Soviet assertiveness in the 
region.11 Another reason for Czechoslovak involvement was political. The expansion 
of Czechoslovak intelligence in Africa was a response to Prague’s new activist 
foreign policy in the continent—in parallel with similar developments in the USSR. 
The Soviet KGB and Czechoslovak StB first developed close ties in 1948. 
After the Soviet-sponsored takeover of Czechoslovakia by the CPC, the 
Czechoslovak security organs went through a process of ‘Sovietization’: institutional 
models were transported directly from the USSR to its Eastern European satellites 
with assistance from Soviet advisors. After Stalin died, direct forms of control were 
superseded by bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in line with Khrushchev’s new 
policy prioritising consultations with Eastern European allies. As part of de-
Stalinization, Khrushchev wanted to reduce the powers of the KGB inside the USSR, 
so he redirected its activities abroad, which aligned with the expansion of Soviet 
policy in the Third World. As a result, the 1950s saw an expansion of the KGB’s 
foreign intelligence in sub-Saharan Africa under Khrushchev’s personal protégé, 
Alexander Shelepin.12 Similar developments took place in Czechoslovakia, where 
Rudolf Barák presided over the expansion of the First Directorate in the 1950s. 
Czechoslovak intelligence employed only one hundred men in 1950, with the number 
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rising to 520 in 1957, 930 four years later, and 1,236 in January 1968, of whom 352 
were stationed abroad.13 
1960 also ushered in a new era of Soviet-Czechoslovak intelligence 
collaboration in Africa. With many African countries expected to reach independence 
in 1960, all eyes were on the continent, now a new arena for superpower competition. 
1960 was also a crucial year for the expansion of Soviet intelligence started in sub-
Saharan Africa. The first democratically elected prime minister of the Congo, Patrice 
Lumumba, appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance in dealing with the secession 
of the resource-rich Katanga province. Before 1960, the majority of communications 
with leaders of the liberation movements were undertaken by the KGB rezidentura 
in Cairo. In August 1960, the crisis in the Congo moved Shelepin to expand the Africa 
desk at the KGB’s First (intelligence) Directorate.14 Due to its long-standing contacts 
in the region, Czechoslovak intelligence became a close partner. In July 1960, 
Shelepin and Barák presided over the meeting of representatives of these two bodies 
to coordinate intelligence activities across the world, which included a pledge to share 
operational information on the ground. In August 1960, Soviet and Czechoslovak 
intelligence launched their first joint operation to support the government of Patrice 
Lumumba, the fist democratically elected prime minister of the Congo.15 While their 
operation in the Congo failed since Lumumba was toppled in September 1960 and 
subsequently murdered in the breakaway Katanga province, Czechoslovakian 
intelligence continued to expand its operations in sub-Saharan Africa. It was in this 
context that ALTER arrived in Conakry to forge contacts with representatives of 
African liberation movements who had found refuge in Guinea.  
ALTER’s name was Miroslav Adámek. Born on January 12, 1927 into a 
workers’ family, Adámek had previously been a locksmith. In 1947, he volunteered 
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for the military service and joined the CPC a year later at a factory in Kuncicky. Three 
years later, he was recruited for the StB. Internal StB reports described him as a ‘calm-
tempered man’ who was a ‘passionate chess player’ with a clear ‘class consciousness’ 
who followed the party line. After undergoing basic training in Opava, he was 
transferred to the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, and in 1960, he was 
posted to the Czechoslovak rezidentura in Conakry. At only 33 years old, Adámek 
was not a particularly experienced officer. However, he was part of a small 
rezidentura, which allowed greater room for personal initiative and, potentially, 
career progression.16 It is perhaps unsurprising that Amadek was quick to establish 
contacts with Cabral, who was in the process of harnessing international support for 
armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. 
Their first meeting took place on November 22 1960, when Adámek invited 
Cabral for lunch to obtain information about the movements ‘in accordance with our 
plan for the Portuguese colonies.’ Adámek had apparently already met Cabral in 
Prague and, according to his report to Prague, he used the opportunity to establish 
contact with him in Conakry. The lunch took place in a ‘friendly atmosphere,’ with 
Cabral arguing that his movement had the support of the people in Guinea-Bissau and 
that his land could be free within two to three years.17 On 13 January 1961, Cabral 
met Adámek again to argue for a reception in Prague. He had already been invited to 
visit the Soviet Union, but he wanted to stop in Prague together with his right-hand 
man, Aristides Pereira. Cabral seemed to have impressed Adámek, as he argued that 
he could have asked for support from the capitalist countries, but he did not do so 
because he saw that there were no strings attached to aid from Czechoslovakia. He 
also underlined that the PAIGC had the best prospects for armed struggle because it 
was based in Guinea-Conakry, which bordered Guinea-Bissau and could be used as 
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a launching pad for operations there. In fact, a rebellion in Guinea-Bissau could serve 
as a catalyst for rebellion in other Portuguese colonies, Angola in particular. Adámek 
supported Cabral’s request.18 
Cabral’s trip to Czechoslovakia in March 1963 went well. Aristides Pereira 
recalled that in Prague they met with Rudolf Barák, who was apparently impressed 
by Cabral and promised to help with the provision of war materiel.19 There is no 
record of Cabral and Pereira ever meeting Barák in Prague. However, Cabral and 
Pereira definitely met Barák’s deputy Karel Klima, whom they asked for weapons, 
financial assistance, experts who could provide training in security, and instructors in 
‘subversive activities.’ 20  One way or another, the Czechoslovak intelligence 
supported Cabral’s request for assistance. In a note to Barák on 27 March 1961, the 
chief of the First Directorate, Jaroslav Miller, argued that Cabral’s requests should be 
satisfied because PAIGC (he still used the earlier name, PAI, in the original) had 
support among the broad masses and had already gathered support for armed struggle 
inside the country. The PAIGC was an anti-imperialist and an anti-capitalist 
organisation, which was led by Cabral, a ‘Marxist-orientated’ politician. Most likely, 
the lengthy note was drafted with help from the Conakry rezidentura and Adámek 
personally.21 
The timing of Cabral’s request was opportune. In February and March, a series 
of popular uprisings broke out in Angola, the largest of Portugal’s colonies in Africa. 
Salazar was determined to hold onto the empire and crushed the uprisings with 
overwhelming force, and crackdown became an international scandal. Portugal was 
condemned at the UN, and on 27 May, the Soviet daily Pravda released a stern 
declaration in support of Angola.22 On 18 April 1961, Czechoslovakia was the first 
country to approve an assistance package, providing regular financial assistance, 
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scholarships, and military training to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA), which was also based in Conakry at that time. 23  These 
developments reflected the heating up of the Cold War. In a meeting with USA. 
President Kennedy at Vienna in June, Nikita Khrushchev threatened to cut Western 
access to West Berlin, sparking what would be known as the Berlin Crisis, which 
eventually led to the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.  
It was in this context of increased interest in liberation movements that 
Miroslav Adámek proposed recruiting Cabral for collaboration with Czechoslovak 
intelligence. In his letter to Barák, Adámek emphasised his good relations with Cabral 
and proposed that recruitment should take place shortly after Prague approved the 
latter’s request for financial assistance and arms. That would be ideal timing, he 
argued, since Cabral believed would feel a sense of debt to Adámek. He also proposed 
keeping his real identity hidden, even though Cabral probably suspected the real 
nature of his job. Besides, common ideology and goals had to be the basis for the 
recruitment: ‘I will emphasise that as he himself could see that the politics of 
Czechoslovakia in Africa are conducted for the benefit of independent African people 
and support their efforts for political and economic independence, which means that 
are our interests are alike’.24 
We don’t fully know what consultations went into the decision to approve 
Adámek’s proposal and how much the Soviets knew about it. From 26-30 June 1961, 
the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence services held their second round of 
coordination meetings to discuss joint operations in the Third World. Among a 
lengthy list of mutually-binding agreements on coordination of intelligence operation 
across the world, the KGB and StB agreed that they would aim to establish contacts 
and recruit agents from among the leadership of the liberation movements in the Third 
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World. They also established a common plan on Angola and the Congo.25 The Soviet-
Czechoslovak proposal does not contain any references to Guinea-Bissau. However, 
a KGB document from July 1961 contained a similar list of proposals to help organize 
anti-colonial mass uprisings in British Kenya and Rhodesia and ‘Portuguese Guinea’ 
(i.e. Guinea-Bissau) by arming rebels and training military cadres to tie down 
Western powers during the settlement of the Berlin question.26 On 1 August 1961, 
Czechoslovakia approved the first assistance package to the PAIGC: monthly 
financial assistance worth 2,500 Czech crowns; a shipment of light weapons for 3,000 
armed men, and a commitment to organising a course for training eleven men in 
Czechoslovakia.27 Given the timing of joint consultations and of Prague’s approving 
the package, it is possible that the Soviet intelligence knew about Czechoslovak plans 
for Cabral and gave their approval. 
While the possibility of using Cabral as an ally in a Cold War in Africa was 
crucial to the Czechoslovak decision to provide assistance, ideology mattered too. In 
his reports to Prague, Miroslav Adámek consistently highlighted Cabral’s left-wing 
views, his Marxist views and his unwillingness to seek assistance from the West. The 
note attached to the resolution from 1 August 1961 also underlined that  Cabral’s 
political philosophy aligned with that of the Czechoslovak government. Cabral did 
not like the thesis that there was no working class in Africa and rejected the notion of 
‘African socialism’. The Czechoslovak were also impressed with Cabral’s ‘deep 
knowledge’ of Marxism-Leninism, which, they believed, he had acquired as a 
political activist in Portugal through contacts with the Portuguese communists.28 
Once Prague approved requests for assistance, Adámek could break the news to 
Cabral and proceed with his ‘recruitment’. 
The ‘recruitment’ meeting took place on 13 August at Adámek’s house in 
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Conakry. When Cabral arrived at 10am, Adámek informed him that his request for 
assistance from Czechoslovakia was granted. Then, as Adámek reported to Prague, 
he used the opportunity to say that they should strengthen their cooperation even 
further because their interests in Africa were alike. To do so, Czechoslovakia would 
require ‘as much precise information as possible’ about the situations in African 
countries and liberation movements. According to Adámek, Cabral “reacted well” to 
the pitch. He appreciated Czechoslovak support because they were the first country 
to provide him with ‘specific and effective help’ in the fight against the Portuguese. 
As for political information, he continued, his options in Guinea were limited because 
he did not always agree with the actions of the authorities, but that he would do 
‘whatever is in his power to help us’. As for any conferences he may attend in person 
or about which he would be informed, he promised to forward this information to us, 
as well as any information about the political situation in Africa. Adámek concluded: 
‘The cooperation with Secretary looks very promising and in my opinion we will be 
able to influence and guide him quite well given his function in PAI (African 
Independence Party)’. 29  From then on, Cabral would be a ‘clandestine contact’ 
(‘důvěrný styk’ or ‘D.S.’ in Czechoslovak classification) of the Czechoslovak 
intelligence. 
It is clear why Adámek played up Cabral’s ‘recruitment’. This was a big ‘win’ 
for a young intelligence officer on his first foreign assignment. It was also a ‘win’ for 
his superiors, who could claim to be running a wide net of intelligence contacts in a 
region still dominated by former colonial powers. However, in actual fact, Adámek’s 
meeting with Cabral was not too different from their previous ones. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Adámek broke his diplomatic cover. No papers were signed. 
Adámek and Cabral continued to meet openly in various locations across the city. As 
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opposed to ‘agent’, the category of ‘clandestine contact’ was flexible enough to allow 
for a casual relationship without formal commitments from either side. While 
Adámek was actively ‘recruiting’ Cabral, the meaning of the meeting was likely very 
different for Cabral, who was generally quite non-committal, albeit courteous. In the 
following years, Czechoslovakia would proceed to extend ever-increasing support to 
the PAIGC, receiving little in return. Indeed, after two years in Conakry, in late 1961, 
Adámek was recalled to Prague, where he continued work at the Africa desk of the 
First Directorate. He was evaluated to have performed well and was promoted to the 
rank of captain. In 1964, he would go on to work as a standalone operative in Kinshasa 
before going back to Prague in 1968.30  
 
Information Gathering and “Active Operations” 
Once the Politburo approved the assistance package to Cabral, the Ministry of 
the Interior went into high gear. In December, Prague shipped its first supply of arms 
to Conakry. The shipment was seized by the Guinean authorities, an issue that became 
an ongoing problem that would only be reserved in early 1963. In August 1961, the 
Ministry of the Interior arranged for eleven members of the PAIGC to receive military 
training in Prague. In the following years and up until 1969, the Ministry of the 
Interior would accept about a dozen men a year for security training.31 In 1962, the 
Czechoslovak intelligence also devised an active operation code-named ‘Hanibal’, 
which involved spreading anti-government propaganda leaflets among the 
Portuguese army. Besides demoralising the army, ‘Hanibal’ was supposed to 
strengthen the position of the PAIGC. The whole operation was to be discussed with 
Cabral, who was supposed to help with the contents of the leaflets.32  Although 
Czechoslovak support was substantial, it was ultimately Cabral who determined  
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strategy in Guinea-Bissau. 
One issue of disagreement between Cabral and Prague was about the starting 
date for military action in Guinea-Bissau. The central issue remained the 
unwillingness of Guinean authorities to release Czechoslovak weapons or officially 
accept any new military shipments for the PAIGC through the port of Conakry. By 
end of 1962, Prague had became increasingly worried that lack of armed action would 
open up the PAIGC to competition from local rivals. The Czechoslovak Ministry of 
the Interior thus advised that the PAIGC should launch acts of sabotage in the 
countryside to prove they represented the nationalist movement in Guinea-Bissau. 
These actions would serve to obtain weapons from the Portuguese and would prove 
to the Guinean authorities that the PAIGC could engage in armed action, even if they 
continued to block the weapons.33 
Cabral disagreed. While sabotage could be effective, he argued it could also 
alarm the Portuguese, leading to the strengthening of their military presence, making 
it more difficult to launch guerrilla actions. Instead, Cabral’s strategy was to find 
alternative routes and suppliers of weapons in Algeria, Morocco, and Ghana. Again, 
Prague lamented that these trips would not be effective and they were too costly. 
Cabral disagreed and went ahead.34 Actually, it was in Morocco and Algeria, where 
he found support from the local authorities to smuggle a small number of weapons to 
Conakry. In fact, Prague used the Morocco to smuggle Czechoslovak weapons to 
Conakry.35 In early 1963, the issue of weapons for the PAIGC was resolved after 
almost two years of negotiation with the Guinean president, Sékou Touré. With the 
Guineans no longer blocking weapons transfers, on 23 January 1963, the PAIGC 
launched its first armed action in Guinea-Bissau.  
Once the PAIGC launched military actions, Czechoslovak assistance 
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expanded. Besides a monthly subsidy of 2,500 Czechoslovak crowns to the PAIGC, 
Prague would yearly approve shipments of weapons and humanitarian goods to the 
PAIGC. Although we don’t know all the figures, in 1965, the monetary value of the 
weapons shipment was 1.85 million crowns; in 1966, it was 400,000 crowns.36 Upon 
Cabral’s request, in September 1964, the Czechoslovak interior ministry also 
dispatched an arms expert, František Polda (code name PETÁK). An arms expert and 
an intelligence officer, Polda had a dual role of acting as a point of contact with Cabral 
and providing advice and intelligence training for PAIGC cadres.37  
František Polda was of course not the only military advisor to the PAIGC. 
Starting from 1966 onwards, the PAIGC received substantial assistance from Cuba, 
including arms, material support. Fidel Castro also dispatched advisors and arms 
experts to help build up and train Forças Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo (FARP), 
the armed wing of the PAIGC. We know that there were important disagreements 
between Cabral and the Cuban advisors on military strategy. Cabral preferred a war 
of attrition in order to avoid high casualties, while the Cubans argued in favor of 
larger operations. We also know Cabral was vigorously independent and often 
resisted Cubans’ prescriptions.38  
The same held true for Cabral’s relations with Polda. Similar to the Cubans, 
Polda believed that the FARP should engage in decisive offensive actions against 
fortified posts, such as against Madina do Boé, in the east of the county. Having 
suffered heavy losses and the death of a friend, Domingos Ramos, Cabral preferred 
to proceed with caution. In a meeting between Polda and Cabral on 9 February 1968, 
Cabral shared that he wanted to test out the impact of the newly acquired 120mm 
mortars by firing them at Madina do Boé. Polda objected, saying that the focus should 
be on destroying the fort rather than on testing the Portuguese reaction. In fact, 
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‘combat operations’ increasingly resembled a game of soldiers rather than a war of 
liberation. Cabral smiled in response, saying that putting psychological pressure on 
the Portuguese was part and parcel of their strategy.39  In the end, the offensive 
operations proceeded apace, devised by the PAIGC central command. Madina do Boe 
was finally captured in 1969. Cabral’s strategy and decisions took priority. 
Czechoslovakia was heavily involved in supporting the PAIGC, especially in the 
early years of the war. What did the Czechoslovak intelligence obtain in return?  
One of their first requests for Cabral was to obtain information about the 
proceedings of the first Non-Aligned Conference, held in September 1961 in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Sponsored by Joseph Bros Tito of Yugoslavia, Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Belgrade conference 
was supposed to launch a movement opposed the creation of blocs, presenting itself 
as an alternative force that placed itself outside of the Cold War. Fearing a string of 
anti-Western proclamations, Washington was originally noncommittal about the 
conference at Belgrade. However, as the Berlin Crisis heated up over the summer of 
1961, US President John Kennedy became increasingly concerned about the weight 
of world of opinion over Berlin and dispatched a message to conference attendees. 
The Soviets also believed that they could use the Belgrade conference to rally 
nonaligned countries behind their interpretation of the German question.40 Cabral was 
also invited to attend the Belgrade conference, and Czechoslovak intelligence 
requested some specific information. In a meeting with Cabral prior to the conference, 
the Czechoslovaks asked him to obtain information on a wide range of issues: the 
delegates’ definition of nonalignment, divisions, views on the German question, 
attitudes towards the Western countries, and opinions on socialist policy in Africa. 
Prague also singled out the Nigerian delegation, asking Cabral to determine whether 
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they would be ‘divisive’, and wanted to know the contents of a special letter from 
Tito to Nehru.41 Upon returning from Belgrade, Cabral made a stopover in Prague, 
where he gave a comprehensive overview of the conference. 
Cabral’s information on the Belgrade conference was fairly general. He 
lamented that the conference was mainly dominated by declaratory statements; 
delegates failed to criticise ‘neocolonialism’, with the exception of Cuba’s address, 
which targeted the USA. In terms of divisions, Cabral described the delegations as 
divided into three main groups. Containing key organisers India, Egypt, and 
Yugoslavia, the first group was led by Prime Minister Nehru and represented the 
‘reactionary’ stance at the conference. Ghana and Indonesia formed the basis of the 
second, more ‘progressive’ group, with Sukarno and Nkrumah proposing a number 
of measures to deal with neocolonialism and provide a solution to the Berlin Crisis. 
Finally, Cuba represented the ‘most progressive’ position, as its delegation lashed out 
at US imperialism and underlined the importance of socialist countries. Cabal also 
underlined divisions among African and Arab states. Cabral didn’t share any details 
of conversation with the delegates and did not know anything about Tito’s letter to 
Nehru. Indeed, the Belgrade conference was divided between those who, like Nehru, 
openly criticised the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing and focused on 
questions of peace and others like Nkrumah, who prioritised questions of colonialism 
and poverty and called for the recognition of both German states. Intentionally or not, 
Cabral’s evaluation of the Belgrade conference did not contain any sensitive 
information or anything one could not obtain from open sources.42  
In general, detailed conference reports were quite rare. The vast majority of 
interactions between Cabral and Czechoslovak intelligence concerned problems of 
the PAIGC and of armed struggle. Cabral would regularly share his views on military 
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progress and the leadership of other liberation movements, such as the Angolan 
MPLA and Mozambican Frelimo—and their local rivals. In early 1962, Cabral 
journeyed to Ghana, Mali, and Morocco to find a route to ship weapons to Conakry 
after the debacle of 1961. In its 1962 plan for Guinea-Bissau, Prague instructed the 
rezidentura in Conakry to find out through Cabral the details of Holden Roberto’s 
trip to Ghana. Holden Roberto was the leader of the Union of People’s of Angola 
(UPA; União das Populações de Angola) and was a key rival of the MPLA, which 
also received assistance from Czechoslovakia. In 1962, Roberto was also harnessing 
international support for his organisation at that time, and Prague naturally wanted to 
know if Kwame Nkrumah, the president of Ghana, supported to the UPA.43 In 1962-
63, the MPLA itself was riven by internal contradictions. For example, Cabral 
supported Agostinho Neto in his dispute with Viriato da Cruz and encouraged 
Czechoslovakia to support the MPLA.44 Cabral also shared his observations about the 
meetings of the CONCP (CONCP; Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das 
Colónias Portuguesas), an organisation established in 1961, which united liberation 
movements from the Portuguese colonies. In 1965, members of the CONCP met in 
Dar es Salaam to discuss common action, including in the military sphere. In meeting 
with Czechoslovak officials, Cabral expressed critical views of FRELIMO’s 
leadership, who, in his opinion, was not particularly interested in cooperation.45 
Czechoslovak intelligence also wanted to use Cabral’s resources for ‘active 
operations’ in Africa. In intelligence jargon common both to the KGB and the StB, 
‘active operations’ or ‘active measures’ (AO) were agent-operational measures, 
directed at exerting influence on the foreign policy of target countries. These involved 
surveillance of Western intelligence services and disinformation campaigns, among 
many other actions. In August 1963, Prague instructed the rezidentura in Conakry to 
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approach Cabral with the task of finding two ‘reliable’ persons who could ‘fulfil 
espionage tasks’. These individuals had to belong to the PAIGC and have good 
recommendations. If such persons could be selected, they would undergo training in 
secret intelligence in Czechoslovakia before being deployed for special tasks.46 The 
issue came up again during Cabral’s talks in Prague. In a meeting with Cabral on 23 
October 1963, Czechoslovak intelligence again reiterated their request to find two 
persons who could collaborate with the rezidentura on a variety of tasks. The 
candidates for such a role had to be reliable, discreet, and dedicated to the party, know 
French, and have the ability to easily forge contacts with people. The list of 
characteristics did not end there. The suitable candidates could not be known PAIGC 
members, and thus Czechoslovak intelligence suggested they could come either from 
Guinea-Bissau or Senegal. Cabral was non-committal. In response to the request, he 
said that the process of finding men with appropriate characteristics had proven much 
more difficult than he had previously thought. The best option would be to find an 
appropriate candidate in Guinea-Bissau and then dispatch them Senegal to acquire 
the necessary skills. Cabral never found appropriate candidates, so the Czechoslovak 
proposal was never put into action.47 
Czechoslovak counterintelligence also requested Cabral’s help with African 
students studying in Czechoslovakia. As the student body expanded in the 1960s, 
African students were commonly a problem for authorities across the socialist bloc, 
as many complained about racism, surveillance, and difficult living conditions. Many 
of these accounts reached the Western press. Since such incidents became a tool in 
Cold War propaganda on both sides, it became a common task of the counter-
intelligence services to weed out potentially troublesome students.48 There were spies 
among African students in Czechoslovakia, argued Czechoslovak officials to Cabral 
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in a meeting on 21 April 1965, and they needed help in identifying them. Prague thus 
wanted Cabral to find a person who was not a known member of the PAIGC and who 
could be enrolled as a student in Czechoslovakia. The idea was for this person to 
develop friendships with other African students and report back to Czechoslovak 
counterintelligence. Again, Cabral did not reject the plan outright. However, he did 
point out that it would be very difficult to find someone from Guinea-Bissau who 
didn’t belong to the PAIGC and who could command respect among the students. 
The best option, he continued, was to find a person who did belong to the PAIGC, 
but who could pose as someone who was not happy with the organisation. Cabral also 
mentioned that he would have to share that information with his closest circle—his 
brother Luis Cabral and Aristides Pereira.49 We don’t know if this plan was put into 
action. However, it reveals Cabral’s evasive tactics, showing his unwillingness to use 
his people for such tasks. 
One exception was the case of RIGOLETO. A member of the PAIGC, 
RIGOLETO was among the first cohort of eleven men who went for military training 
in Prague in August 1961. The Czechoslovak intelligence first approached 
RIGOLETO at a hospital in Prague when he was undergoing medical care. While 
others finished the course, RIGOLETO stayed on in Prague, undergoing special 
training in security and counter-intelligence, with Cabral’s approval. Czechoslovak 
intelligence seemed to like RIGOLETO, whom they described as ‘decisive, 
organised, and disciplined’. In a dispatch to the rezidentura in Conakry, 
Czechoslovak intelligence noted it had already obtained useful information from 
RIGOLETO, especially regarding rival nationalist movements based in Guinea-
Bissau and Senegal. The Czechoslovak intelligence and RIGOLETO also agreed that 
he would help in ‘active operations’ against Western intelligence services in Conakry. 
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They also agreed on a special password for communication: 
‘Do you know Mr. Abel from Bafata?’ 
‘I do know him and his whole family.’50 
One of such active operations was code-named operation ‘GOLD’—a rescue 
mission for Antoine Gizenga in the Congo. Gizenga was a Congolese politician, a 
minister in Patrice Lumumba’s first government. After a coup in Leopoldville in 
September 1960, Gizenga left to organise armed resistance against the government 
for a stronghold in Stanleyville, in eastern Congo. However, Gizenga was unable to 
get supplies to sustain his armed effort. In July 1961, supporters of Gizenga and 
representatives of the government in Leopoldville brokered a power-sharing 
agreement at the University of Lovanium. Cyrille Adoula became the new prime 
minister of the Congo and Gizenga was elected his deputy in absentia. However, key 
posts were still occupied by members of the so-called Binza Group who coalesced 
around Joseph Mobutu, the chief of the army. In early 1962, Gizenga was placed 
under house arrest in Leopoldville. There were fears that Gizenga could follow the 
fate of Patrice Lumumba who was murdered in a breakaway province of Katanga in 
January 1961. To enact the plan, Czechoslovak officials asked for RIGOLETO’s 
help.  
It is not clear exactly the role that RIGOLETO was to play in Gizenga’s 
escape. Most likely, he was to collect intelligence on the ground in Leopoldville and 
serve as a go-between. The Czechoslovak rezidentura in Conakry was to deliver 
RIGOLETO to Leopoldville.. There, he was supposed to meet another contact, ‘our 
man in Leopoldville’, who would explain what was required of him. Prague had high 
hopes for RIGOLETO, 'a confidential contact who had been previously tested in our 
American surveillance operation in Conakry’. We don’t know how much Cabral 
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knew about the Czechoslovak plan to rescue Gizenga, but he apparently let them have 
RIGOLETO. 51  While the rescue mission never went ahead, Czechoslovak 
intelligence continued contacts with RIGOLETO. In 1966, he was transferred to the 
CONCP Secretariat in Rabat, Morocco. Cabral apparently ‘fully agreed’ that 
RIGOLETO should work with Prague. To avoid any suspicion, he asked that 
Czechoslovakia pay RIGOLETO’s salary in Conakry, which the PAIGC would then 
transfer to Rabat so that RIGOLETO could receive an official source of income. 
Cabral described RIGOLETO as a ‘capable comrade’ who was reliable and dedicated. 
Only women were his ‘weak spot’.52  
SEKRETÁŘ and Kwame Nkrumah 
On 24 February 1966, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was 
overthrown in a coup d’état. The coup was a loss for the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries that had forged close relations with Nkrumah in previous years. 
After the coup, Nkrumah settled in Conakry upon the personal invitation of Guinean 
president Sékou Touré. While the coup was bloodless, Nkrumah was determined to 
return to Ghana as the legitimately elected president, and the socialist countries 
wanted to help. It is well known that Amílcar Cabral was among those who visited 
Nkrumah in Conakry during his years of exile. The two men had known each other 
since the early 1960s, when Nkrumah provided some assistance to the PAIGC. 
However, it is not widely known that Czechoslovak intelligence wanted to influence 
Nkrumah’s actions after the coup via Cabral. The main goal was to convince 
Nkrumah to launch a resistance movement in Ghana.   
Czechoslovakian intelligence had a series of conversations with Cabral about 
Nkrumah between 1966 and 1968. In a conversation with Frantisek Polda on 13 May 
1966, Cabral shared his opinion that Nkrumah should have established an 
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underground resistance movement right after the coup. Otherwise, he risked losing 
any support he had left in Ghana.53 Cabral discussed Nkrumah with the head of the 
StB’s African department, Josef Janouš, when he came to Prague in November 1966. 
This time Cabral was more optimistic, saying that Nkrumah still enjoyed some 
support in Ghana, that his prospects were quite good, and that he deserved help. He 
still did not know Nkrumah’s plans first-hand, but he had learnt from Sékou Touré 
that at least one group was undergoing training in Guinea for the purposes of 
infiltrating Ghana. Czechoslovakian intelligence in turn asked Cabral if he could 
speak to Nkrumah, promise help, and, above all, convince him to focus his energies 
on organizing a resistance movement in Ghana.54  
Cabral became increasingly sceptical of Nkrumah’s capacity for decisive 
action. When Cabral met Janouš next on 6 February 1967 in Prague, he spelled out 
his frustration with Nkrumah, whom he had eventually managed to meet in person in 
Conakry. Describing the meeting with Nkrumah to Janouš, Cabral said that he did not 
think it was a wise idea for Nkrumah to publish his book, Handbook on Revolutionary 
Warfare, in which he proposed the creation of an all-African working class vanguard 
party and the all-African people’s army and militia. The book was unrealistic and 
risked exposing Nkrumah’s strategy to the imperialists. He also said that Nkrumah 
was unresponsive to criticism and had asked Cabral to allocate a group of guerrilla 
fighters from among the PAIGC militants who could organize resistance in Ghana. 
Janouš agreed that Nkrumah had to put aside his Pan-Africanist theories and focus on 
organizing the resistance in Ghana. Yet again, Janouš asked Cabral to use his 
influence with Nkrumah for this purpose, but without him knowing about 
Czechoslovakia’s involvement.55 On 25 February 1968, meeting František Polda in 
Conakry, Cabral said that Nkrumah knew very little about the internal situation in 
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Ghana, that he had become more of a philosopher than a politician, and that his plan 
to liberate the African continent was not realistic.56 
Czechoslovak concern for Nkrumah’s plans was part of operation ‘ALEX’—
an attempt to sponsor a left-wing counter coup in Conakry. It is not clear what role 
Nkrumah was supposed to play in the coup. Certainly, Cabral relayed some messages 
about preparations for a coup attempt in Conakry. In case any of these proved 
successful, Nkrumah could perhaps return to Ghana as the head of state or other 
official capacity. These efforts were not successful, and at least one person in regular 
contact with Czechoslovak intelligence was arrested on sabotage charges in August 
1968.57 Nonetheless, Czechoslovak intelligence seemed pleased with Cabral’s role 
playing the unofficial go-between. On 4 April 1969, looking back at relations with 
Cabral over the previous nine years, Czechoslovakian intelligence specifically noted 
Cabral’s role in relations with Nkrumah, both before and after the coup in Ghana.58 
In the late 1960s, contacts between Czechoslovak intelligence and Cabral 
subsided. This was because Cabral was very busy as the liberation struggle unfolded 
and as he became an African leader of major importance. In addition, the PAIGC by 
that point received an increasing supply of donations—from the Soviet Union, but 
also from the Nordic countries in the early 1970s. By 1968, Czechoslovak intelligence 
lamented the fact that it was very difficult to obtain information about African issues. 
Cabral had the status of an African leader and was always travelling and meeting with 
high officials. In a three-month period, the rezidentura could only organise one dinner 
with the [Czechoslovak] Ambassador. As a result, the rezidentura in Conakry could 
no longer use the PAIGC against Western intelligence. Still, Czechoslovak 
intelligence found that their relationship with Cabral had been useful in helping in the 
organisation of certain ‘active operations’ and in participating in ‘influence measures’ 
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with regards to Kwame Nkrumah. Given Cabral’s status, he could no longer be asked 
to participate in small and local events. However, the relationship could still be 
usefully employed at a ‘high level’, especially in the future.59 
Czechoslovak intelligence made every effort to portray their work with the 
PAIGC and Cabral as a success. In an overview of Frantisek Polda’s term in Conakry 
in 1968, Josef Janouš gave a stellar review. Polda had done a great job of using the 
PAIGC cadres to exert influence in regional organisations and influence the exile 
group around President Nkrumah in Conakry. On top of that, Polda had secured such 
prestige within the PAIGC that is was him, boasted Janous, and not the Cuban 
advisers, who was considered the main military counsellor on matters of military 
strategy. Janous also commended Polda for showing and ‘extraordinarily sensitive 
approach to Africans’, knowledge of the fighters, bravery, and ‘high devotion in the 
fulfilment of his tasks’. As a result of his excellent service, Janous thus granted him 
a reward of 2500 Czechoslovak crowns for the period 1967-8 and promoted him to 
the job of senior referent of the fourth department of the First Directorate.60  
The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 played a crucial 
role in the scaling down of StB operations in Africa. Many StB intelligence agents 
either participated or were sympathetic to the ideals of the Prague Spring. After the 
Soviet invasion, many defected from field operations. Those who stayed in active 
service but were suspected of sympathies for Dubcek’s movement underwent internal 
reviews, were dismissed, or worse. One of many who got in trouble was Miroslav 
Adámek, the intelligence officer who recommended recruiting Cabral in 1961. After 
leaving Conakry in 1961, Adámek obtained a number of foreign assignments, but in 
1968, he ‘surrendered to the anti-Soviet psychosis’ and signed a resolution 
condemning the Soviet invasion. However, his career did not end there, apparently 
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because he ‘joined the consolidation process at his workplace’. It is not clear what 
this exactly meant. Most probably, this involved Adámek admitting to his mistakes 
and getting involved in the consolidation of the new regime.61 Others chose not to 
give public support for Dubcek’s government in August. Such was Frantisek Polda. 
In a service evaluation from 1977, the StB commented that Polda relied ‘firmly on 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism’ during 1968 
and helped the ‘consolidation process’ at the StB. 62  In the post-1968 period 
Czechoslovakia turned inwards, with the government trying to mend the fabric of the 
social order after the Soviet intervention. The Czechoslovak rezidentura tried to 
maintain contact with Cabral, but the meetings were quite irregular. The official 
explanation was that Cabral was often absent from Conakry, yet the general volume 
of intelligence activity declined in that period.63  
Only in 1973 did Czechoslovak intelligence try to revamp its relationship with 
Cabral. Unsurprisingly, the man chosen for the mission was no less than Frantisek 
Polda, who arrived in Conakry in mid-January 1973. Polda’s report shows him going 
around Conakry trying to strike up conversations with people he knew. He found 
Cabral and Aristides Pereira working at PAIGC headquarters. In his report to Prague, 
Polda reported that Cabral looked ‘somewhat on edge,’ but he thought that this 
stemmed from his role as the party leader and not because he was uneasy about 
Polda’s arrival. Polda proceeded to explain the situation in Czechoslovakia to Cabral 
‘according to instructions’, answering why he could not pay much attention to the 
PAIGC in the previous years. According to Polda, attitudes towards Czechoslovakia 
had not changed and that everyone had received him very well. On 16 January, Polda 
met Cabral, and the two decided to meet later for a proper conversation. However, 
the conversation never took place because on 20 January, Cabral was murdered in a 
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coup attempt in Conakry. In an overview of the Czechoslovak relationship with 
Cabral since 1961, Prague admitted that the character of the relationship was mainly 
‘political’. As a leading politician, Cabral was used to influence Africa, public 
opinion in a variety of forums. In addition, Cabral was intended to influence 
Nkrumah. Regular contacts lasted only up until 1970 and declined because Cabral 
was rarely in Conakry.64  
How much did the Soviets know about the nature of the Czechoslovak 
relationship with Cabral? Among thousands of page of files on Cabral and the 
PAIGC, there are only a few references to consultations with the ‘comrades’ in the 
USSR. Most of it was likely related to questions of military strategy for Guinea-
Bissau. In a 1966 report from a consultation meeting with the Soviets, both sides 
agreed to come up with a ‘tactical plan’ for Guinea-Bissau and train cadres who could 
enact the military vision in consultation with the Cubans. Among the conclusions, the 
last one concerned Cabral, who was to be used for ‘intelligence purposes, against 
Western intelligence organisations and ‘politics of influence’.65 Another piece of 
evidence comes from a Czechoslovak note drafted in preparation for the meeting with 
the intelligence service of the German Democratic Republic. Answering a request for 
information from GDR intelligence, Prague prepared a detailed report about the 
military situation in Guinea-Bissau. Summing up, Czechoslovak intelligence stated 
that they used Cabral and other PAIGC representatives to obtain first-hand 
information about African countries and to implement ad-hoc ‘active operations’.66 
Although it is not clear exactly what was shared with colleagues from the GDR, the 
special relationship with the PAIGC and Cabral (no matter the official status) was 
most likely not a secret. While we don’t have complete information, the few 
documents show that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union did consult with each 
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other and tried to coordinate their support for the PAIGC. 
 
Conclusion 
Czechoslovakia was a crucial early ally of the PAIGC in its early years in 
Conakry. While the Soviet Union would come to occupy the central role as the 
PAIGC’s international donor, Czechoslovakia was crucial in the early stage, 
providing the first weapons, training, and cash for the movement in 1961. Its 
involvement in supplying the PAIGC with its first arms and cash was much larger 
than was previously known. We also know why that part of the reason was the 
importance of Amílcar Cabral as ‘D.S. SEKRETÁŘ’ for Czechoslovak intelligence. 
Czechoslovak intelligence believed that by enlisting Cabral as an ‘agent of influence’ 
and by providing assistance to the PAIGC they would acquire an important ally in the 
Cold War in Africa. That explains why Czechoslovakia was so closely involved in 
supporting the PAIGC in the 1960, despite financial difficulties. 
The story also illuminates a previously unknown side of Cabral’s diplomacy. 
In 1960, the PAIGC was an unknown movement with limited international support, 
forced to struggle against rival organisations based in Conakry and Dakar, Senegal. 
To ascertain leadership status, the PAIGC required external support to launch an 
armed struggle, which could only be obtained from the socialist countries. Cabral 
entered into a relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence for pragmatic reasons: to 
obtain support for the PAIGC. In the environment of the Cold War, talking and 
engaging with intelligence services was part of the deal. While we will never know 
how Cabral himself envisioned his relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence, he 
was an independent agent who managed to shape the relationship to his advantage. In 
terms of relaying information about events and people, Cabral never went much 
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beyond a general conversation about what he saw and believed. The same was true 
for his role in relation to Kwame Nkrumah. Cabral seemed to have agreed with Prague 
that Nkrumah should have organised resistance to the coup, so their opinions were 
quite alike. When the Czechoslovaks ask him to find men for ‘special operations’, he 
did not refuse outright, but didn’t fulfil the requests either. In the end, even 
Czechoslovak intelligence had to admit in internal documents that the relationship 
with D.S. SEKRETÁŘ was mainly based on Cabral’s status in African politics and 
that they did not get much in terms of hard intelligence from him.  
This story sheds light on the role of human intelligence during the Cold War. 
Like their Western counterparts, the socialist countries were keen to deploy secret 
intelligence to fight the Cold War in Africa. As opposed to Europe or the USA, it was 
cheaper and potentially easier to ‘contacts’ or ‘agents’ in the context of post-colonial 
Africa. This was a consequence of European imperialism. As European empires 
withdrew from Africa, they did not leave strong institutions that could deal with the 
influx of rival Western and Eastern intelligence agencies. However, we should not 
overestimate the significance of human intelligence. As the case of D.S. SEKRETÁŘ 
shows, Cabral’s engagement with Czechoslovak intelligence gave Prague little power 
over the PAIGC or Cabral and few advantages. While Czechoslovak intelligence ran 
D.S. SEKRETÁŘ on paper, in reality, Cabral obtained support from Prague without 
giving much in return. Cabral was a man who skillfully used international diplomacy 
for the advantage of his movement, thus securing the support that would allow the 
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